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Abstract—Software model checking, as an undecidable prob-
lem, has three possible outcomes: (1) the program satisfies the
specification, (2) the program does not satisfy the specification,
and (3) the model checker fails. The third outcome usually
manifests itself in a space-out, time-out, or one component of the
verification tool giving up; in all of these failing cases, significant
computation is performed by the verification tool before the
failure, but no result is reported. We propose to reformulate
the model-checking problem as follows, in order to have the
verification tool report a summary of the performed work even
in case of failure: given a program and a specification, the model
checker returns a condition Ψ —usually a state predicate— such
that the program satisfies the specification under the condition Ψ
—that is, as long as the program does not leave states in which
Ψ is satisfied. We are of course interested in model checkers
that return conditions Ψ that are as weak as possible. Instead
of outcome (1), the model checker will return Ψ = true; instead
of (2), the condition Ψ will return the part of the state space
that satisfies the specification; and in case (3), the condition Ψ
can summarize the work that has been performed by the model
checker before space-out, time-out, or giving up. If complete
verification is necessary, then a different verification method or
tool may be used to focus on the states that violate the condition.
We give such conditions as input to a conditional model checker,
such that the verification problem is restricted to the part of the
state space that satisfies the condition. Our experiments show
that repeated application of conditional model checkers, using
different conditions, can significantly improve the verification
results, state-space coverage, and performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Model checking is an automatic search-based procedure that
exhaustively verifies whether a given model (e.g., labeled tran-
sition system) satisfies a given specification (e.g., temporal-
logic formula) [11], [27]. For models with infinitely many
states, a model checker usually first constructs an abstract
model with finitely many states. A successful technique for
this abstraction process is counterexample-guided abstraction
refinement (CEGAR) [12], which is an iterative process that
starts with a coarse abstract model and successively refines the
abstract model, according to information learned from abstract
counterexamples.
CEGAR-based model checking was successfully applied to
software programs, where it is referred to as software model
checking. In addition to classic abstract domains, the most
widely used abstract analysis is predicate analysis [17], which
uses a set of predicates as precision of the analysis, that is,
an abstract state is a boolean combination of predicates that
occur in the given precision set. Predicates can be obtained
from a counterexample program path (CEX) by (1) mining
the predicates from the CEX via static analysis [1], (2)
interpolation along path formulas representing the CEX [19],
or (3) loop-invariant generation for path programs [5]. Further
improvements of efficiency and effectiveness of the predicate
analysis can be obtained by integrating all components of
the CEGAR-procedure into one single on-the-fly algorithm
for the construction of an abstract reachability tree [21],
by dynamically adjusting the analysis precision [7], and by
encoding large program blocks into formulas that represent
many transitions [3].
Since software model checking is an undecidable problem,
there are three possible outcomes of the analysis process: (1)
the program satisfies the specification, (2) the program does
not satisfy the specification, and (3) the model checker fails.
The first outcome can be obtained by the model checker if the
abstract model that was computed for the program is sufficient
to prove the program correct under the given specification.
This outcome can be accompanied by a proof certificate [20].
The second outcome can be obtained by the model checker if
an abstract counterexample path is found and can be proven
feasible, i.e., a bug that can actually occur in the program.
This outcome is usually accompanied by the violating program
part in the form of program source code, and sometimes test
input to reproduce the error at run-time [2]. The third outcome
usually occurs if the model checker runs out of resources
(memory exhausted, time-out) or if one of the components
in the verification tool gives up. The failure of refinement,
i.e., the model checker does not succeed in eliminating an
infeasible CEX, is an example for the latter case (this occurs
if the chosen technique for predicate extraction is not strong
enough). In all of these failing cases, significant computation is
performed by the verification tool before the failure. But since
no useful result is reported, the spent resources are wasted.
With our approach of conditional model checking, we
propose a new definition of the model-checking outcome.
The goal of conditional model checking is to maximize the
outcome of a model-checking run under certain conditions,
e.g., a given set of resources. We reformulate the model-
checking problem as follows: Given a program and a spec-
ification, conditional model checking returns a condition Ψ
—usually a state predicate— such that the program satisfies
the specification under the condition Ψ —that is, as long as
the program does not leave states in which Ψ is satisfied.
We are interested in model checkers that return conditions
Ψ that are as weak as possible. This way, the verification
tool reports a summary of the performed work even if the
Fig. 1. Example state space; with condition Path Length and limit 7, states
in the gray box are skipped by the analysis, the dark-red error state (on the
right) can be found fast, green states are verified
tool cannot completely verify the program. The outcomes of
a model-checking run can be translated to conditions in the
following way: Previous outcome (1) corresponds to the con-
dition Ψ = true . That is, if the model checker returns true as
condition, the model checker completely verified the program
under no additional conditions. For outcome (2), the model
checker does not return false , but can specify program parts
that are free of errors, and explicitly exclude the violating
parts. For example, consider an invalid program that consists
of two branches, one of which is safe and the other violates
the specification. The resulting condition for this program
would contain all program states that occur in the successfully
verified branch and report an error path that violates the
specification. In outcome (3), in which the model checker
previously failed with “no useful results”, the condition Ψ now
summarizes the work that has been performed by the model
checker before space-out, time-out, or giving up. For example,
consider a valid program that consists of two branches, one
of which is easy to verify by the model checker and the
other leads the model checker into an infinite loop. Using
conventional model checking, we would not get any feedback
from the model checker, because the time-out would cause a
failure. Our modified approach of conditional model checking
would still be unable to prove that the program satisfies
the specification. However, it would heuristically detect the
hopeless situation and summarize the performed work by
reporting that (at least) the first branch has been successfully
verified. If complete verification is necessary, then a different
verification method or tool may be used to focus on the states
that violate the condition. Figure 1 illustrates an example state-
space, where the verification engine is restricted to verify only
paths that are not longer than seven nodes.
We implemented several techniques to prevent the model
checker from failure. First, we monitor the progress for
every critical component of the model checker. When such a
component fails to deliver results (exhausts its assigned time
or memory), the monitor discovers the problem, terminates
the component, and generates a condition that excludes the
corresponding states from the verification result. Second, we
implemented several conditions that try to predict situations in
which the model checker should not continue to try verifying
this part of the program, and generate conditions excluding
that part. Such conditions make it possible to verify larger
parts of the program, instead of spending all time on a
particular, unsolvable problem. Thus, if we cannot completely
verify a program, we at least obtain a “verification coverage”
that is as large as possible, and we can use the resulting
condition to continue the verification with different tools and
configurations. Third, we can use the negation of the condition
generated by one analysis as the condition for a subsequent
analysis, letting the latter check those parts of the state space
that the former did not verify successfully.
Our experiments show that these conditions can also sig-
nificantly improve the performance; for example, programs
for which the model checker previously failed after spending
minutes, can now be proved to violate the specification within
seconds.
Contributions and Applications. Conditional model check-
ing enables the following features that were not possible in
conventional model checking before:
• No Fail. Every run of the model checker results in a
condition formula that summarizes the achieved results.
• Maximal Outcome. Conditional model checking maxi-
mizes the outcome for a given set of resources (mem-
ory/time limit).
• Regression Checking. The conditions can later be used for
re-verification, i.e., if started with the condition formula
as additional input, the conditional model checker can
a priori exclude certain parts from the verification. If the
program was only slightly changed, then this approach
speeds up the re-checking significantly.
• Partial Verification. Conditional model checking can be
used to restrict the verification to certain parts of the pro-
gram, by taking as input a condition formula that excludes
the parts that should not be verified. For example, some
parts of the system might be checked via model checking,
others via testing, theorem proving, or complementary
model checkers.
• Improved Performance for Bug Hunting. Conditional
model checking enables the specification of conditional
iteration orders. For example, we can specify that the
model checker searches each abstract path for a given
amount of time (conditional DFS) or each abstract path up
to a certain length (similar to bounded model checking).
This approach significantly improves the performance for
programs with errors.
• Benchmark Generation. Conditional model checking can
be used to produce hard verification benchmarks, by
generating excluding conditions for all parts that can
(currently) not be model checked. If started with the
generated conditions as input, the model checker will
verify the maximal verifiable program fragment, and the
time to prove this fragment correct can be measured.
• Comparison of Tools. Given two model checking tools,
we can not only compare the time and memory needed
for a given verification task (cf. benchmarks above), but
we can now compare the quality of the verification results
(the weaker the condition, the better).
Tool Implementation. We implemented conditional model
checking using standard components of the open-source
verification framework CPACHECKER [8]. Our extension of
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1 void main() {
2 int x = 1;
3 if (nondet_int()) {
4 while (x < 10000) {
5 x++;
6 }
7 assert (x == 10000);
8 } else {
9 x = 0;
10 }
11 assert (x != 0);
12 }
Fig. 2. Example program with loop
CPACHECKER and all benchmark programs that we used in our
experimental evaluation are available from the supplementary
website.
Example. Loops introduce challenges for static program anal-
ysis. For example, if the domain of abstract predicates with
lazy abstraction is used for the analysis, there is the possibility
that each step of loop unwinding will add a new predicate and
verification will be performed until the entire path is unwound.
In some cases that operation might be repeated thousands of
times and this will lead the analysis to get stuck in the loop.
The example in Fig. 2 presents a case where the analysis
might fail to terminate. If the analysis has to fully unwind
the loop in this program, the analysis will not terminate in
a reasonable amount of time. In that case, the verification
outcome would be ‘fail’. At line 11, there is another assertion
and the analysis would miss the opportunity to investigate this
part of the specification because it is busy with checking the
loop. If the analysis is started with a condition that limits the
number of unwindings of a loop to at most k iterations, it will
finally skip the loop and verify the rest of the program. This
way it can determine that the assertion at line 11 does not hold
and report an error without much effort. If the specification
were not violated in the rest of the program, the outcome
would be ‘safe’ under the assumption that the program visits
the loop entry at most k times (as in bounded model checking).
Model checking with predicate analysis depends on the ca-
pabilities of SMT solvers, and thus can only verify conditions
that can be expressed in the theories that are supported by the
integrated SMT solver. This excludes, for example, properties
that depend on non-linear relations between program variables,
as shown in the snippet of Fig. 3. Suppose we analyze
this program with a conventional predicate analysis. Given a
precision that includes the predicate (i ≥ 1000000), the model
checker will easily be able to prove that the assertion in line 7
can never fail. However, as our predicate analysis is based
on linear arithmetics and needs to model the multiplication
of program variables as uninterpreted function, the model
checker cannot prove that the second assertion in line 13 also
always holds. A precise path analysis reveals that the path
is infeasible, thus, the analysis has to give up. Fig. 5 shows
the abstract reachability tree (ART) that the analysis would
generate. Each ART node is labeled with the control-flow
node that it belongs to and the formula that represents the
abstract state. The ART edges are labeled with the assumptions
that the analysis produced during the verification run. In this
1 int main() {
2 int p = nondet_int();
3
4 if (p) {
5 int i;
6 for (i = 0; i < 1000000; i++);
7 assert(i >= 1000000);
8
9 } else {
10 int x = 5;
11 int y = 6;
12 int r = x * y;
13 assert(r >= x);
14 }
15 return 0;
16 }
Fig. 3. Example program with non-linear safety condition
case, there is only one non-trivial assumption at the edge from
program location 13 to 14. For all other edges the assumption
is true and not shown in the ART.
In conditional model checking, the model checker outputs
an assumption that explicitly states which parts of the program
are safe and which parts are not checked. This assumption
can be written in several formats; we choose the following
two. First, we create an assumption formula over the program
locations and variables. In this case, the assumption would
be (pc = 13) ⇒ (r ≥ x). This is both human readable
and useful as input for a subsequent analysis. Second, we
convert the abstract reachability tree that was produced by the
model checker into an assumption automaton that is annotated
with the generated assumptions. The assumption automaton
that the analysis outputs for this example is shown in Fig. 6.
Each transition of the automaton is labeled with a control-flow
edge (e.g., “2 → 4” is the edge from location 2 to 4) and the
assumption that was used when taking this edge. Parts of the
ART where the assumption is always true are collapsed into
a single sink state ‘T’, which has a self edge that matches any
control-flow edge. For all other parts of the ART there is a 1:1
correspondence between ART nodes and automaton states.
Compared with the assumption formula, the assumption
automaton offers an easier way to specify complex facts
over program paths instead of just over program locations.
It is equally useful as input condition for a second analysis
of the program, for example, using a configuration that is
better suitable to verify the remaining parts of the state space.
This second analysis has to analyze only those paths of the
program that contain at least one edge where the assumption
is not true. This can be implemented easily by letting the
automaton run in parallel to the analysis, taking the matching
transition whenever the analysis takes a program edge. Then
the exploration of a path can be stopped as soon as the
automaton reaches the sink state ‘T’, as this means that the
assumption of all future edges would always be true.
For the program in Fig. 3, a good choice for verifying the
assertion in line 13 is an explicit-value analysis for integers.
If the assumption automaton from Fig. 6 is used to restrict the
analyzed state space, the explicit-value analysis needs to prove
only the safety of the second assertion, which it can check
efficiently. The final analysis correctly results in reporting
3
45
 [p]
10
 [!(p)]
6a
6b
 i = 0
6c
 [i < 1000000]
7
 [!(i < 1000000)] i++
2
 int p = nondet_int();
 int i;
11
 int x = 5;
8
 assert(i >= 1000000);
15
12
 int y = 6;
13
 int r = x * y;
14
 assert(r >= x);
16
 return 0;
Fig. 4. Control-flow automaton for example
program with non-linear safety condition
2
true
4
true
5
true
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true
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true
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6c
true
7
i >= 1000000
6b
true
covered by
8
i >= 1000000
15
i >= 1000000
11
true
12
true
13
true
14
true
 r >= x
15
true
16
true
covered by
Fig. 5. ART for example program with non-linear
safety condition; covered states are gray, edges are
labeled with assumptions
T  * → * true
 2 → 4
 true
 4 → 5
 true
 4 → 10
 true
 10 → 11
 true
 11 → 12
 true
 12 → 13
 true
 13 → 14
 r >= x
 14 → 15
 true
Fig. 6. Assumption automaton for example pro-
gram with non-linear safety condition
that the program is safe. However, note that an explicit-
value analysis cannot verify the other assertion (it would
have to unroll the loop a million times, probably exceeding
all available time or memory resources). Thus it is indeed
necessary to use the assumption from the first run to guide
the second analysis.
By using two different model-checking configurations, and
by giving detailed information about the verified state space
in form of a condition, this example can be proved safe. No
configuration is able to verify this alone; both would either fail
due to resource exhaustion or terminate without useful results.
Related Work. The assume-guarantee paradigm is a well-
known principle of verification theory [22]. Conditional model
checking (CMC) implements this paradigm: “if the program
fulfills the (generated) assumptions, then the program is guar-
anteed to satisfy the specification”. A formal system should ex-
plicitly state under which conditions it guarantees correctness.
ESC/JAVA uses an annotation language for Java to let the user
encode conditions for pruning false alarms [16]. Thus, the user
can choose a compromise between soundness and efficiency.
CMC follows this principle by allowing the model checker to
take conditions as input. Bounding the path length in symbolic
execution is a well-known technique [23]. Bounded model
checking (BMC) is successful in finding bugs, but is often
rejected as verification technique because it is unsound [9]. If
the condition of unwinding every loop up to a certain bound is
stated explicitly, then it would be a sound conditional model-
checking technique. The bounded model checker CBMC does
report whether the program contains paths that exceed the
given bounds, or whether the program could be verified
completely [13]. This can be nicely expressed as a condition,
but conditional model checking is more powerful as more
information is reported. Nimmer and Ernst efficiently extract
program specifications from dynamic analysis [26]. Although
the approach is unsound, the generated specifications can
effectively cover a large part of the state space. Conditional
model checking also has the objective to improve the veri-
fication coverage. Conway et al. define a points-to analysis
with conditional soundness [14]. Many software-verification
tools make implicit assumptions about the program, sacrificing
soundness in order to be practically useful. For example, the
predicate-abstraction–based tools SLAM and BLAST implicitly
use the assumption that the program does not contain integer
overflows, and model variables as unbounded mathematical
integers (cf. [4], page 515). Several verification tools use
heuristics similar to our conditions (search strategies, itera-
tion orders, pruning, etc.) in order to find safety violations
faster [15], [24]. JPF is a tool which allows arbitrary user-
defined search strategies [18]. Conditional model checking
makes these heuristics externally visible and adjustable in the
form of conditions.
Summary. Conventional model checkers may fail without any
useful result; in fact, this is by far the most common output
of model checkers in practice. In conditional model checking,
the model checker is required to always provide a result to
the user — ideally a proof or counterexample, but if this is
not possible, then the conditional model checker reports the
work it has done in the form of a summary, namely, as a
condition that characterizes the part of the state space that has
been proven correct. This report can be used to improve future
verification runs, by the same or by different tools, avoiding
to repeat work that has already been done.
4
II. PRELIMINARIES
We are briefly providing some basic notions and concepts
from the literature [4], [6], which our definitions are based on.
Programs. We restrict the presentation to a simple imperative
programming language, where all operations are either assign-
ments or assume operations, and all variables range over inte-
gers.1 A program is represented by a control-flow automaton
(CFA), which consists of a set L of program locations (models
the program counter pc), an initial program location pc0
(models the program entry), and a set G ⊆ L × Ops × L
of control-flow edges (models the operation that is executed
when control flows from one program location to another). The
set of program variables that occur in operations from Ops is
denoted by X . A concrete state of a program is a variable
assignment c : X ∪ {pc} → Z that assigns to each variable
an integer value. The set of all concrete states of a program
is denoted by C. A set r ⊆ C of concrete states is called a
region. Each edge g ∈ G defines a (labeled) transition relation
g→ ⊆ C ×{g}×C. The complete transition relation → is the
union over all control-flow edges: → = ⋃g∈G g→. We write
c
g→c′ if (c, g, c′) ∈ →, and c→c′ if there exists a g with c g→c′.
A concrete state cn is reachable from a region r, denoted by
cn ∈ Reach(r), if there exists a sequence of concrete states
〈c0, c1, . . . , cn〉 such that c0 ∈ r and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we
have ci−1→ci.
Configurable Program Analysis. We formalize our reacha-
bility analysis using the framework of configurable program
analysis (CPA) [6]. A CPA specifies —independently of
the analysis algorithm— the abstract domain and a set of
operations that control the program analysis. Such a CPA can
be plugged in as a component into the software-verification
framework without the need to work on program parsers, ex-
ploration algorithms, and their general data structures. A CPA
C = (D, ,merge, stop) consists of an abstract domain D,
a transfer relation  (which computes abstract successor
states), a merge operator merge (which specifies if and how
to merge abstract states when control flow meets), and a stop
operator stop (which specifies if an abstract state is covered by
another abstract state). The abstract domain D = (C, E , [[·]])
consists of a set C of concrete states, a semi-lattice E over
abstract-domain elements, and a concretization function that
maps each abstract-domain element to the represented set of
concrete states.
Using this framework, program analyses can be composed
of several component CPAs. For example, a standard predicate
analysis can be created as the composition of the following two
CPAs.
CPA for Location Analysis. The CPA for location analysis
L = (DL, L,mergeL, stopL) tracks the program counter pc
explicitly.
1. The domain DL is based on the flat lattice for the set L of
program locations:
DL = (C, EL, [[·]]), with EL = ((L∪{>}),v), l v l′ if l = l′ or
l′ = >, [[>]] = C, and for all l in L, [[l]] = {c ∈ C | c(pc) = l}.
1Our implementation is based on CPACHECKER [8], which accepts
C programs given in C Intermediate Language CIL [25], and supports
interprocedural program analysis.
2. The transfer relation  L has the transfer l
g Ll′ if g =
(l, ·, l′).
3. The merge operator does not combine elements when
control flow meets: mergeL(l, l
′) = l′
4. The termination check returns true if the current element is
already in the reached set: stopL(l, R) = (l ∈ R).
CPA for Predicate Analysis. The CPA for predicate analysis
P = (DP, P,mergeP, stopP), a program analysis for pred-
icate abstraction that tracks the validity of a finite set Π of
predicates over program variables, consists of the following
components:
1. The domain DP = (C, E , [[·]]) models abstract states as
formulas that represent regions (of concrete states). The semi-
lattice E = (F ,⇒) is based on the set F of quantifier-free
boolean formulas over variables from X . The concretization
function [[·]] : F → 2C assigns to each abstract state e its
meaning, i.e., the set of concrete states that it represents:
[[e]] = {c ∈ C | c |= e}.
2. The transfer relation  P has the transfer e
g Pe′ if e′ is the
strongest boolean combination of predicates from Π that is
implied by the strongest postcondition of the abstract state e
and the operation of g.
3. The merge operator does not combine elements when
control flow meets: mergeP(e, e
′) = e′.
4. The termination check considers abstract states individually:
stopP(e,R) = (∃e′ ∈ R : e⇒ e′).
Analysis Algorithm. Algorithm 1 shows the program-analysis
algorithm that is implemented in the tool CPACHECKER. The
algorithm gets as input a CPA and two sets of abstract states:
one is the set R0 (reached) of reached abstract states, and one
is the set W0 (waitlist) of abstract states that the algorithm is
told to process next. The algorithm stops if the set waitlist is
empty (all abstract states completely processed) and returns
the two sets reached and waitlist.
Algorithm 1 CPA(D, R0,W0)
Input: a CPA D = (D, ,merge, stop),
a set R0 ⊆ E of abstract states,
a subset W0 ⊆ R0 of frontier abstract states,
where E denotes the set of elements of the semi-lattice of D
Output: a set of reachable abstract states,
a subset of frontier abstract states
Variables: two sets reached and waitlist of elements of E
1: reached := R0;
2: waitlist := W0;
3: while waitlist 6= ∅ do
4: choose e from waitlist; remove e from waitlist;
5: for each e′ with e e′ do
6: for each e′′ ∈ reached do
7: // Combine with existing abstract state.
8: enew := merge(e
′, e′′);
9: if enew 6= e′′ then
10: waitlist :=
(
waitlist ∪ {enew}
) \ {e′′};
11: reached :=
(
reached ∪ {enew}
) \ {e′′};
12: // Add new abstract state?
13: if ¬ stop(e′, reached) then
14: waitlist := waitlist ∪ {e′};
15: reached := reached ∪ {e′};
16: return (reached, ∅)
5
For the first call of the algorithm, the parameter arguments
will be singletons containing the initial abstract state. In
each iteration of the ‘while’ loop, the algorithm takes one
state e from the waitlist, computes all abstract successors and
processes each of them as e′.
Next, the algorithm checks (lines 6–11) if there is an
existing abstract state in the set of reached states with which
the new state is to be merged (e.g., at join points where control
flow meets after completed branching). If this is the case, then
the new, merged abstract state is substituted for the existing
abstract state in both sets reached and waitlist. (This operation
is sound because the merge operation is not allowed to under-
approximate.)
In lines 12–15, the stop operator ensures that the new
abstract state is inserted into the work sets only if it is a
new state, i.e., not covered by a state that is already in the
set reached.
III. CONDITIONAL MODEL CHECKING
In the following, we characterize common failure causes
for model checkers, present preventing conditions for those
causes, and later give formal definitions for the program
analyses that we implemented to experiment with conditional
model checking.
A. Failure Classes and Failure-Preventing Conditions
Classes of Failures. There are various reasons for a model
checker to fail during the verification process. We are particu-
larly interested in classifying the failures according to the part
of the verification algorithm where the problem occurs.
1) Global Progress. If the model checker does not stop
continuously adding new abstract states to the set of
reachable states, it will sooner or later run out of
resources. For example, in an explicit-value analysis,
a loop might be unfolded many times (cycling) and
many explicit values are stored for a particular location.
To prevent the model checker from running into such
a situation, we can measure the number of abstract
states in the reached set for a certain location and
generate an excluding assumption. Similarly, we can
monitor the total number of abstract states, total memory
consumption and total time consumption.
2) Post Computation. The computation of the abstract
successor might fail because the new abstract state
might be too large, or too difficult to compute (memory,
time). If this occurs, the monitoring component stops
the analysis of the specific part, adds an excluding
assumption, and lets the analysis continue on another
path. Various conditions can be used to prevent the
model checker from spending time on difficult program
parts. For example, we could measure the size of the
analysis precision (e.g., the number of predicates for a
certain location exceeds a given threshold, which makes
in turn the computation of the predicate abstraction
expensive) and stop exploring the current successor if
a certain threshold is exceeded.
Component Name Condition Impl.
Global
Progress
Total Time time X
Total Space mem X
# Abstract States |reached| X
# Abstract States per Loc. #(reached, loc)
Busy Edge #(edge) X
Post
Computation
Time for Post time( ) X
Space for Post mem( )
Size of State mem(state)
Path Length length(path) X
Time Spent in Path time(path) X
Repeating Locs. in Path #(path, loc) X
Assume Edges in Path assumes(path) X
CEX
Analysis
Time for Refinement time(ref ) X
Space for Refinement mem(ref )
Size of Path Formula mem(pf ) X
Fig. 7. Example Conditions for Conditional Model Checking; column Impl.
lists the conditions we implemented
3) Counterexample Analysis. If an abstract error path has
been found, it needs to be analyzed for feasibility and
possible refinements. This step might fail in a predicate-
abstraction-based analysis if the feasibility check of the
path (performed by an external SMT solver) fails, or if
the refinement process did not succeed in eliminating the
infeasible error path (e.g., the used predicate-extraction
technique might not be strong enough). If a failure
of a component occurred, an excluding assumption is
generated for a pivot node on the path. To prevent the
refinement component from failure, we can measure the
length of the path, the predicates involved, the structure
of the path formulas, etc.
Preventing Conditions. We classify the conditions into the
above-mentioned categories according to the location of oc-
currence in the analysis algorithm, and provide an incomplete
list of example conditions (as an overview, cf. Fig. 7):
Global Progress — Total Time and Space. Measure the total
time and memory consumption of the model checker. If a
resource limit is reached, then the analysis is stopped and
excluding assumptions are generated for all abstract states
that are still in the waitlist at this moment. In contrast to
‘hard’ resource limits that we can set (e.g., with ulimit),
these ‘soft’ limit enables the model checker to perform post-
processing and output the verification results as an assumption
formula.
Global Progress — Number of Abstract States. Measures the
total number of the elements in the set of reached abstract
states. If the number of states is larger than a certain thresh-
old, the analysis is stopped and excluding assumptions are
generated for all abstract states that are still in the waitlist at
this moment.
Global Progress — Number of Abstract States per Location.
Measures the number of elements in the set of reached abstract
states that belong to each program location. If any location has
more states attached to it than the limit, all post computations
for incoming edges of this location are not performed anymore,
and instead excluding assumptions are added.
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Global Progress — Busy Edge. Measures the total number
of post operations that the currently considered edge of the
control-flow automaton was involved in. If the edge is used
more often than allowed by a given threshold, post operations
for this edge are not performed anymore, but rather excluding
assumption are computed.
Post Computation — Time and Space for Post. Measures the
time of each transfer in a component analysis. If the operation
takes longer than the specified time limit or exceeds the
specified memory limit, the operation is terminated, and an
excluding assumption for the abstract state is added.
Post Computation — Size of Abstract State. Measures the size
of the current abstract state, and if the specified threshold
is reached, an excluding assumption is added. If predicate
analysis is used, we take the number of disjuncts in the
abstraction formula of the abstract predicate state.
Post Computation — Path Length. Measures the number of
abstract states on the path to the current abstract state, and if
the specified threshold is reached, an excluding assumption is
added. (If several paths lead to the current abstract state, the
maximum value is considered.)
Post Computation — Time Spent in Path. Measures the total
amount of time consumed on the path to the current abstract
state, and if the specified time limit is exceed, an excluding
assumption is added. (If several paths lead to the current
abstract state, the maximum value is considered.)
Post Computation — Repeating Locations in Path. Measures
the number of occurrences of the current program location
on the path from the root to the current abstract state in the
abstract reachability tree. If a program location is encountered
more than a specified number of times on a single path, an
excluding assumption is added.
Post Computation — Assume Edges in Path. Measures the
total number of assume edges seen on the path to the current
abstract state, and if the specified threshold is exceed, an
excluding assumption is added. (If several paths lead to the
current abstract state, the maximum value is considered.)
Counterexample Analysis — Time and Space for Refinement.
The execution of each refinement step for a given analysis is
monitored. If the operation takes longer than the specified time
limit or exceeds the specified memory limit, the operation is
terminated, and an excluding assumption for the abstract state
is added.
Counterexample Analysis — Size of Path Formula. We measure
the size of the path formula, which is used for checking feasi-
bility and for computing interpolants for predicate refinement.
If the formula exceeds a certain size, we do not start the SMT
solver on that formula, but rather add an excluding assumption.
B. Formalization and Implementation
We formalize conditional model checking using the frame-
work of configurable program analysis (CPA) [7]. We re-use
existing CPAs for domains like predicate and location analysis,
and add new CPAs for tracking conditions and assembling
assumptions. Then, we use a composite CPA to combine them.
C
Composite CPA
A L R P
Assumption
Tracking
Location
Monitoring
Repeating
Locations
Predicates
Fig. 8. Schematic view of an exemplary CPA combination
An example for a CPA configuration structure is illustrated in
Figure 8.
CPA for Assumptions. The CPA for Assumption Storage A =
(DA, A,mergeA, stopA) is a CPA that stores the assumptions
collected during the analysis. The abstract domain DA, the
transfer relation A, the merge operator mergeA, and the stop
operator stopA are explained in the following.
1. The domain DA = (C, EA, [[·]]A) is based on the semi-
lattice EA = (F ,⇒), where F is the set of quantifier-free
formulas over variables from X . An abstract state represents
an assumption made by the model checker about the concrete
states of the program. The meaning of the assumption is that
the verification result is guaranteed if all assumptions are
fulfilled.
2. The transfer relation  A is the set {(e, g, e′) | e 6= false,
g ∈ G, e′ = true}. The successor state is always the abstract
state that makes no assumptions. This will be refined by the
strengthen operator ↓ of the composite CPA. If the predecessor
state has the assumption false , the analysis does not proceed
because the assumptions already exclude the current path.
3. The merge operator computes the conjunction of both
assumptions: mergeA(e, e
′) = e ∧ e′. Merging the abstract
states of A ensures that the number of abstract states is not
increased by adding assumptions to the analysis (as there will
never be two abstract states in the reached set which differ
only in their assumptions).
4. The termination stop considers abstract states individually:
stopA(e,R) = (∃e′ ∈ R : e′ ⇒ e) returns true, if there is a
state in the set of reached states that has a stricter assumption.
CPA for Overflow Monitoring. Variables of a computer
program are always bounded (e.g., to 32 bits) and therefore
have a minimum as well as a maximum value. If the value
exceeds the maximum, an overflow occurs, i.e., the program
continues with a different value. However, predicate analyses
usually ignore overflows and model variables as unbounded
mathematical integers. Thus, the analysis would be unsound.
We define a CPA that observes the progress and generates
the necessary assumptions under which the analysis is sound.
These assumptions can also be used to remove infeasible paths
from the explored state space. The CPA for Overflow Moni-
toring O = (DO, O,mergeO, stopO) tracks the assumptions
for overflows of program variables. For simplicity, we assume
that all program variables have the same type with a minimal
value of MIN and a maximum value of MAX.
1. The domain DO is based on boolean formulas: DO =
(C, EO, [[·]]), with EO = (F ,⇒), where F is the set of
quantifier-free boolean formulas over variables from X .
2. The transfer relation creates an assumption if the current
program operation might lead to an overflow. If the edge g
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is an assignment of the form x = t, where x ∈ X and t is
a term over variables from X , the successor state ψ′ is the
formula (x ≥ MIN)∧(x ≤ MAX). In other cases the successor
state is true . We assume that overflows occur only at the end
of the computation, when the result of t is assigned to x.
Statements in which overflows occur in intermediate results
are transformed into simpler statements by pre-processing.
If this CPA produces an assumption, it will be added to
the abstract state of the CPA for predicate analysis by the
strengthen operator ↓. This will help the analysis by excluding
parts of the state space that are infeasible because of an
overflow for a variable.
3. The merge operator combines elements by taking the
conjunction: mergeO(ψ,ψ
′) = ψ ∧ ψ′.
4. The termination stop stopO always returns true .
CPA for Repeating Locations Monitoring. We present a CPA
that monitors how often a single location was encountered
on a path and stops the analysis when this number exceeds
a threshold. The CPA for repeating locations monitoring
R = (DR, R,mergeR, stopR) tracks the maximum number
of times a location has been seen on a path leading to the
current abstract state, and stops the analysis when appropriate.
1. The domain DR is based on a map from locations to natural
numbers: DR = (C, ER, [[·]]), with ER = (((L→ N)× B),v),
(e, t) v (e′, t′) if t = t′ and for all le in L, e(le) = e′(le).
An abstract state consists of (1) a map from locations to
natural numbers that stores how often a location has been seen
on the path to the current state, and (2) a flag that shows
whether at least one location was seen more often than the
user-specified threshold k for repetition of locations in a path.
2. The transfer relation  R has the transfer (e, t)
g R((e′, t))
for g = (l, ·, ls) if (1) t′ = (∃l′′ ∈ L : e′(l′′) > k) and (2)
the following holds:
∀l′′ ∈ L : e′(l′′) =
{
e(l′′) + 1 if l′′ = ls
e(l′′) else
3. The merge operator combines elements by taking the
maximum number of occurrences for each location when
control flow meets: mergeR((e, t), (e
′, t′)) = (e′′, t′′) such that
for all l in L, we have e′′(l) = max(e(l), e′(l)) and t′′ = t∨t′′.
4. The termination check always returns true because the
decision whether an abstract state is covered does not depend
on the state of the conditions CPA.
Composite CPA. The composite CPA combines an existing
CPA like the predicate abstraction CPA P with the assumption
tracking CPA A, the CPA for location monitoring L, and one
CPA for conditions that limits the search space. These CPAs
are called component CPAs. The definition of the composite
CPA can easily be extended in order to have several condition
CPAs run in parallel by adding more component CPAs.
As an example we present here the composite CPA for
predicate abstraction together with monitoring of repeating
locations. Other combinations are similar. In fact, only a single
operator (the strengthen operator ↓) and the merge strategy
need to be changed in order to adopt the CPA to other
configurations.
1. The domain DC is defined by the cross product of the
domains of A, L, R and P.
2. The transfer relation C is the cross product of the transfer
relations of the composite CPAs, but with the strengthen
operator ↓ applied on the successor states:
 C = {((eA, eL, eR, eP), g, (e′′A, e′′L, e′′R, e′′P), ) |
(eA, g, e
′
A) ∈ A, (eL, g, e′L) ∈ L,
(eR, g, e
′
R) ∈ R, (eP, g, e′P) ∈ P,
(e′′A, e
′′
L, e
′′
R, e
′′
P) = ↓(e′A, e′L, e′R, e′P)}
In the case the conditions CPA detects that a threshold
is exceeded (for repeating locations monitoring this means
that e′R = (·, true)), the strengthen operator adds an as-
sumption to the abstract state that excludes the current path:
↓(e′A, e′L, e′R, e′P) = (false, e′L, e′R, e′P) if e′R = (·, true).
Otherwise it is the identity function. If another CPA that
generates assumptions (like the Overflow Monitoring CPA)
is present, the strengthen operator would also add the as-
sumptions generated by this CPA to the assumptions stored
by the Assumption Storage CPA, and to the abstract state of
the Predicate Abstraction CPA.
3. The merge operator mergeC merges elements, if the location
and the predicate abstraction part of them is equal:
merge((eA, eL, eR, eP), (e
′
A, eL, e
′
R, eP))
= (mergeA(eA, e
′
A), eL,mergeR(eR, e
′
R), eP)
Otherwise, it returns its second argument (i.e., does not
merge).
This relies on the fact that mergeP never merges abstract
states. If another CPA with a different merge implementation
is used instead of P this needs to be adjusted.
4. The stop operator is the conjunction of the stop oper-
ators of the component CPAs: stop((eA, eL, eR, eP), R) =
stopA(eA, RA)∧stopL(eL, RL)∧stopR(eR, RR)∧stopP(eP, RP)
where RA, RL, RR and RP are the projections of R to the
respective parts of the tuple that form an abstract state.
Assumptions Post-Processing. Once the model checker de-
cides to terminate (either verification is complete, a violation
is found, or resource limit reached) some post-processing is
performed in order to produce the assumption formula as
the result of the model checker run. The result of the CPA
algorithm is the tuple (reached,waitlist). For each abstract
state (eA, l, ·, eP) ∈ reached that is either still contained in
the waitlist or belongs to the error location (i.e., l = le),
the formula (pc = l) ⇒ ¬eP is created. For all other states
(eA, l, ·, eP) ∈ reached the formula (pc = l) ⇒ (¬eP ∨ eA)
is created. Then, the final invariant is the conjunction of all
these formulas.
This can be extended to more complex analyses like
CEGAR. If the model checker detects an infeasible error
path (e0, . . . , en) but fails to compute a better precision that
would exclude this path, the assumption (pc = li)⇒ ¬ePi is
added for all states ei = (·, lli, ·, ePi) beginning with the first
unreachable state in the path until en.
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As an additional output, the model checker always returns
the abstract reachability tree [4], which serves as proof certifi-
cate in case of successful verification, and contains the error
path in case a violation of the specification is found (a human-
readable version of the error path is also printed).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Our experiments give evidence of the practical benefits of
conditional model checking over conventional model check-
ing. We evaluate the following three aspects:
First, we generalize the statement that bounded model
checking is effective and efficient for finding bugs to condi-
tional model checking: not only the number of loop unwind-
ings can restrict the state space in such a way that shallow bugs
can easily be found, but also other conditions can be effective
for this. For example, we use conditional model checking with
conditions on the path length.
Second, we show how to improve the verification result
by applying different complementary tools or analysis ap-
proaches, one after the other, leveraging the complementary
strengths of the different approaches. Restricting the resources
that are spent for a particular analysis approach can dra-
matically improve the overall verification performance (i.e.,
the total sum of consumed analysis resources) and also the
effectiveness (number of solved problems).
Third, we show that providing the conditions produced
by one verification approach (which did not succeed to
completely verify the program) to another approach or tool,
can improve the performance and effectiveness of successive
verification runs.
Configurations. We experimented with several verification
configurations of the tools CBMC and CPACHECKER. The tool
CBMC is a bounded model checker that is based on a tightly
integrated SMT solver for precise bitwise arithmetics [13].
This tool is extremely fast in finding shallow bugs, but
generally cannot prove safety of programs that contain loops
with many iterations or with unknown bounds. It is configured
with a parameter k that limits the number of unwindings of
the loops in the program. The tool CPACHECKER is an open
verification platform with support for explicit-value analysis
and predicate analysis. We implemented the conditions from
Sect. III-A and apply some of them to condition the veri-
fication engine of CPACHECKER. We configure CPACHECKER
to perform an explicit-value analysis, which keeps track of
integer values explicitly while searching in depth-first order
through the state space. In this configuration, the abstract
states at meet points of the control flow are not joined in
order to obtain a precise analysis. However, such a precise
analysis usually exhausts the given memory quickly for large
programs, and may get stuck in loops since no abstractions or
summaries are computed. We also configure CPACHECKER for
a predicate analysis with lazy abstraction [21], CEGAR [12],
and large-block encoding (LBE) [3]. This is a powerful but
expensive analysis, consuming large amounts of resources
when verifying large programs. It is based on linear arithmetics
in order to allow for Craig interpolation, and therefore cannot
handle overflows or bitwise operators. In both configurations,
CPACHECKER was configured to check every error report using
CBMC (i.e., whenever CPACHECKER finds an error path, it
generates a C program for the path and queries CBMC about
the feasibility of it). In cases where CBMC determines a path
as infeasible, we continue the analysis in order to check for
the existence of a different feasible error path. However, if no
error path is found, the analysis result is ‘unknown’ instead of
‘program is safe’ (because there might be some abstract states
that are covered by the infeasible error path which were not
analyzed).
Experimental Setup and Reporting. All experiments were
performed on a machine with a 3.4 GHz Quad Core CPU
and 16 GB of RAM. The operating system was Ubuntu 10.10
(64 bit), using Linux 2.6.35 as kernel and OpenJDK 1.6 as
Java virtual machine. We took the CPACHECKER components
from revision 3820 of the repository and CBMC in version 4.0
for running the experiments. Unless stated otherwise, a hard
time limit of 15 minutes and a memory limit of 14 GB were
used. CPACHECKER was configured with a Java heap size of
4 GB when using predicate abstraction (to leave enough RAM
for the SMT solver), and 12 GB for other configurations. This
was sufficient memory for all experiments.
For each run, the tables show the consumed processor time
of the verifier (in seconds) and a symbol for the result. The
symbol ‘X’ indicates that the model checker computed the
correct answer (bug found or safe). A dash means that the
model checker did not succeed in completely checking the
program. There was no experiment for which a verifier com-
puted a wrong answer (no false-positives, no true-negatives).
Programs whose name contains BUG are known to be unsafe.
Benchmark Programs. We ran our experimental setup on
three sets of benchmark verification problems. The first set
contains simplified, partial Windows NT device drivers; the
second set contains simplified versions of the state machine
that handles the communication in the SSH suite. Different
numbers in a program name indicate different safety properties
that are verified. These two sets of benchmark programs were
taken from the BLAST repository 2. The third set of programs
contains SystemC programs from the supplementary web page
of SYCMC [10] 3.
A. Model Checking using Conditions
First we show that conditional model checking (by applying
state-space restriction conditions) can significantly increase the
verification effectiveness and reduce the verification resources
when applied to the problem of finding program bugs.
Configurations. Table I reports performance results for ex-
plicit analysis for programs with a known bug. The time limit
was set to 3 min for the explicit analysis since it is an effective
technique to detect easy-to-find bugs and a small time limit
is usually enough for this configuration to terminate with a
result. The column ‘Condition & Threshold’ lists the used
condition and the corresponding threshold value. For example
2 http://www.sosy-lab.org/∼dbeyer/Blast
3 https://es.fbk.eu/people/roveri/tests/fmcad2010
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Conventional MC Conditional MC
Configuration Program Result Condition & Threshold Result
Explicit
Analysis
pc_sfifo_1_BUG 180 - Repeating Locations in Path: 3 1.5 X
pc_sfifo_2_BUG 180 - Repeating Locations in Path: 3 1.6 X
test_locks_14.BUG 180 - Path Length: 85 33 X
test_locks_15.BUG 180 - Path Length: 90 54 X
transmitter.15.BUG 180 - Path Length: 600 4.9 X
transmitter.16.BUG 180 - Path Length: 600 3.3 X
TABLE I
CONVENTIONAL VERSUS CONDITIONAL ANALYSIS ON PROGRAMS WITH BUG
‘Path Length: 90’ means that the analysis verified only paths
up to a length of 90 program statements.
Discussion. Conventional model checking fails to find the
violation of the specification within the specified time limit.
Conditional model checking using explicit analysis with the
condition ‘Path Length’, or condition ‘Repeating Locations
in Path’ identifies the error in the examples. The experi-
ments show a significant performance improvement: The two
pc_sfifo benchmark programs, which were analyzed using
Repeating Locations in Path condition with a threshold value
of 3, were falsified in less than 2 s. The test_locks_*.BUG
programs were tested using Path Length condition with thresh-
old values 85 and 90 respectively, and were falsified in less
than 1 min. For the transmitter.*.BUG programs the same
condition was used with a threshold of 600, and they were
falsified in less than 5 s.
B. Repeated Model Checking with Different Conditions
We demonstrate that different tools and different configura-
tions of conditional model checkers can significantly improve
the results of the verification process, by systematically start-
ing the model checkers with different verification objectives.
Configurations. We experiment with three verification tech-
niques and their combinations. First, we run CBMC with two
different values for the loop bound k (columns ‘CBMC k = 1’
and ‘CBMC k = 10’). Second, we use CPACHECKER with
explicit-value analysis with a time bound of 10 s (‘Explicit
time(10s)’), and without a time bound (‘Explicit’). Third, we
run CPACHECKER with predicate analysis (‘Predicate’). These
first five data columns of Table II report the results of using
such configurations.
The last two columns show the results for two combina-
tions of model-checking configurations. Different verification
tools and techniques perform better on different verification
problems based on their focus and capabilities. For example,
some configurations are better in detecting shallow bugs and
some are better in proving the absence of safety violations.
We combine them by running the first configuration, which is
possibly limited by some condition. If this analysis terminates
with a result of ‘bug found’ or ‘program is safe’, the verifi-
cation is finished. If the analysis, however, terminates without
a final verification result, e.g., due to imprecision or due to
the condition preventing a complete analysis, we will restart
the analysis with the next configuration, until a final result is
obtained or there is no further configuration. In all cases, the
final result is the result of the last configuration, and the total
time is the sum of the run-times of all used configurations.
Discussion. CBMC with the loop bound set to 1 is not able
to verify many programs, but is a very fast configuration.
The total time necessary to analyze all 44 programs is only
about 3.4 s. It should be noted that when CBMC is not able to
produce a useful result, the run-time is almost always under
0.1 s. Although CBMC is a bounded model checker, it is able
to verify the safety of a few programs that contain only simple
or no loops. When increasing the loop bound (e.g., to k = 10),
CBMC is able to verify some more programs, but also needs
much more time. This even happens for programs with bugs,
where it reaches the timeout in several cases. Much time and
effort is spend to verify only six additional programs (cf. rows
‘total’).
The explicit-value analysis of CPACHECKER (limited with
time(10s)) is able to find many more bugs than CBMC with
k = 10, while using significantly less time. In contrast to
CBMC, this configuration spends more time on examples for
which it is not able to compute a verification result. The reason
is that it discovers one abstract state after the other, terminating
as soon as an error state has been reached or the program was
verified completely. However, the run-time is still only a few
seconds for all examples, and it is much less than CBMC with
loop bound 10, although the number of successfully verified
programs is significantly higher. For some programs (e.g., for
diskper_simpl1), the model checker runs a few seconds
longer than the time limit. This is because our implementation
of the time limit affects only the actual analysis, but the time
listed in the table is the total run-time, including program
startup and parsing.
The two columns ‘Explicit’ (without condition) and ‘Pred-
icate’ show the results of running CPACHECKER with explicit-
value analysis and predicate analysis, respectively. These
configurations are bounded only by the global time limit
of 15 min, no condition is used. Due to this fact they are
able to verify a substantial number of programs, compared
to the bounded configurations. However, both fail on several
examples due to a time out, and thus have a dramatically high
total run-time. Explicit analysis is sometimes too imprecise to
verify a safe program (e.g., bist_cell).
A comparison of the columns ‘Explicit’ and ‘Explicit
time(10s)’ also demonstrates how conditions can be useful
in optimizing the verification process. As shown in the row
‘Total’ at the bottom of the table, with time-limit condition
it takes a total of 230 s to run all programs whereas it takes
3300 s without the condition. Even though the total run-time
is significantly higher, explicit analysis without condition can
successfully analyze only two more programs. The configura-
tion using a condition also reports the assumptions generated
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CBMC CPACHECKER Comb. A Comb. B
Explicit Explicit Predicate Expl. + Pred. CBMC+Expl.+Pred.
k = 1 k = 10 time(10s)
cdaudio_simpl1 1.0 X 1.0 X 3.5 X 3.2 X 17 X 3.5 X 1.0 X
cdaudio_simpl1_BUG .99 X .99 X 2.8 X 2.5 X 10 X 2.8 X .99 X
diskperf_simpl1 .25 - .26 - 13 - 900 - 15 X 28 X 28 X
floppy_simpl3 .16 X .15 X 2.9 X 2.4 X 8.5 X 2.9 X .16 X
floppy_simpl3_BUG .16 X .16 X 2.2 X 2.5 X 7.8 X 2.2 X .16 X
floppy_simpl4 .28 X .28 X 3.5 X 3.7 X 12 X 3.5 X .28 X
floppy_simpl4_BUG .30 X .30 X 3.0 X 2.9 X 11 X 3.0 X .30 X
kbfiltr_simpl1 .05 X .06 X 3.1 X 2.2 X 3.7 X 3.1 X .05 X
kbfiltr_simpl2 .11 X .10 X 3.1 X 3.2 X 5.2 X 3.1 X .11 X
kbfiltr_simpl2_BUG .11 X .12 X 2.2 X 2.1 X 4.1 X 2.2 X .11 X
NT drivers total 3.4 9 3.4 9 39 9 920 9 94 10 54 10 31 10
s3_clnt_1 .03 - 4.3 - 9.8 X 8.3 X 8.1 X 9.8 X 9.8 X
s3_clnt_1_BUG .03 - 4.2 - 4.4 X 3.6 X 6.2 X 4.4 X 4.4 X
s3_clnt_2 .03 - 4.6 - 10 X 8.2 X 7.2 X 10 X 10 X
s3_clnt_2_BUG .03 - 4.3 - 4.5 X 3.5 X 5.4 X 4.5 X 4.5 X
s3_clnt_3 .03 - 5.3 - 9.7 X 8.1 X 5.8 X 9.7 X 9.7 X
s3_clnt_3_BUG .03 - 5.3 X 5.1 X 3.5 X 6.0 X 5.1 X 5.1 X
s3_clnt_4 .03 - 4.8 - 9.8 X 8.5 X 10 X 9.8 X 9.8 X
s3_clnt_4_BUG .03 - 4.3 - 4.3 X 3.5 X 6.4 X 4.3 X 4.3 X
s3_srvr_1 .03 - 4.1 - 3.3 X 2.4 X 21 X 3.3 X 3.3 X
s3_srvr_1_BUG .03 - 6.4 X 2.2 X 1.7 X 4.8 X 2.2 X 2.2 X
s3_srvr_2 .03 - 5.5 - 2.8 X 2.4 X 150 X 2.8 X 2.8 X
s3_srvr_2_BUG .03 - 6.2 X 1.8 X 1.7 X 4.1 X 1.8 X 1.8 X
s3_srvr_3 .03 - 5.6 - 3.6 - 2.6 - 9.0 X 13 X 13 X
s3_srvr_4 .03 - 5.6 - 3.1 - 2.5 - 28 X 31 X 31 X
s3_srvr_6 .03 - 6.6 - 14 - 250 X 230 X 240 X 240 X
s3_srvr_7 .03 - 6.3 - 14 - 200 X 47 X 61 X 61 X
s3_srvr_8 .03 - 6.1 - 2.8 X 3.0 X 23 X 2.8 X 2.8 X
SSH total 0.51 0 90 3 110 13 510 15 570 17 420 17 420 17
bist_cell .02 - .65 - 9.4 - 9.2 - 210 X 220 X 220 X
kundu .02 - 120 - 7.3 X 6.2 X 900 - 7.3 X 7.3 X
kundu1_BUG .02 - 18 - 2.0 X 1.8 X 15 X 2.0 X 2.0 X
kundu2_BUG .02 - 120 - 1.6 X 1.9 X 510 X 1.6 X 1.6 X
pc_sfifo_1 .02 - 12 - 14 - 900 - 5.3 X 19 X 19 X
pc_sfifo_2 .02 - 6.3 - 14 - 900 - 9.8 X 24 X 24 X
token_ring.01 .02 - 16 - 1.7 - 1.6 - 8.1 X 9.8 X 9.8 X
toy2_BUG .03 - 30 - 2.7 X 2.1 X 65 X 2.7 X 2.7 X
transmitter.01.BUG .02 - 5.3 X 1.7 X 1.5 X 2.2 X 1.7 X 1.7 X
transmitter.02.BUG .02 - 21 X 2.0 X 1.7 X 5.1 X 2.0 X 2.0 X
transmitter.03.BUG .03 - 92 - 2.0 X 1.8 X 36 X 2.0 X 2.0 X
transmitter.04.BUG .03 - 270 - 2.2 X 2.5 X 900 - 2.2 X 2.2 X
transmitter.05.BUG .04 - 670 X 2.5 X 2.3 X 900 - 2.5 X 2.5 X
transmitter.06.BUG .04 - 900 - 3.4 X 3.0 X 900 - 3.4 X 3.4 X
transmitter.07.BUG .04 - 900 - 3.8 X 3.3 X 900 - 3.8 X 3.8 X
transmitter.08.BUG .05 - 900 - 6.3 X 4.6 X 900 - 6.3 X 6.4 X
transmitter.09.BUG .05 - 900 - 11 X 9.4 X 900 - 11 X 11 X
SystemC total 0.49 0 5000 3 88 13 1900 13 7200 10 320 17 320 17
Total 4.4 9 5100 15 230 35 3300 37 7800 37 790 44 770 44
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT MODEL-CHECKING CONFIGURATIONS AND THEIR COMBINATIONS
Combination A: Explicit with 10 s time limit and Predicate
Combination B: CBMC with k = 1, Explicit with 10 s time limit and Predicate
The run-time values are given in seconds and with two significant digits.
during the analysis so that the user can see which parts of the
state space were analyzed and which were not.
By combining several configurations, the effectiveness of
the verification process can be improved significantly, both in
the number of verified programs as well as in the run-time.
Bounded model-checking is good in finding shallow bugs,
and explicit analysis with the limiting condition is good in
finding possibly deep but still “easy” bugs, but for proving
program safety, predicate abstraction is the best choice. Thus,
we first spend a limited effort in finding bugs with the efficient
configurations. If no final result is given, we switch to the next
more powerful —and more expensive— analysis.
Explicit-value analysis can efficiently identify some bugs
that predicate abstraction cannot find, even if the former is
used as a conditional model checker. If the explicit-value
analysis with a time-limit condition does produce a useful
result, then it is usually faster than predicate abstraction,
although this configuration is not powerful enough to analyze
some programs due to its limitations. The combination of these
two configurations together is strictly more powerful than any
configuration alone, and can verify all benchmark programs,
but is also more expensive in terms of run-time.
CBMC with k = 1 is always extremely fast to compute
a verification result, or it gives up after a negligible amount
of time (ca. 0.1 s) such that the effort spent in CBMC does
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Program Explicit Predicate Comb. A Conditional MC
Explicit + Predicate Explicit + Predicate
token_ring.01.BUG 1.6 - 4.0 X 5.6 X 2.6 X
token_ring.01 1.9 - 8.9 X 11 X 2.4 X
token_ring.02.BUG 2.3 - 24 X 26 X 4.3 X
token_ring.02 1.7 - 900 - 900 - 4.0 X
token_ring.03.BUG 2.6 - 900 - 900 - 5.4 X
token_ring.03 2.5 - 900 - 900 - 5.1 X
token_ring.04.BUG 2.7 - 900 - 900 - 9.1 X
token_ring.04 2.5 - 900 - 900 - 8.5 X
token_ring.05.BUG 3.8 - 900 - 900 - 16 X
token_ring.05 3.2 - 900 - 900 - 17 X
token_ring.06.BUG 4.8 - 900 - 900 - 34 X
token_ring.06 5.4 - 900 - 900 - 40 X
token_ring.07.BUG 9.1 - 900 - 900 - 140 X
token_ring.07 8.3 - 900 - 900 - 180 X
token_ring.08.BUG 25 - 900 - 900 - 580 X
token_ring.08 6.0 - 900 - 900 - 720 X
token_ring.09.BUG 120 - 900 - 900 - 900 -
token_ring.09 130 - 900 - 900 - 900 -
mem_slave_tlm.1 2.0 - 900 - 900 - 5.2 X
mem_slave_tlm.2 2.8 - 900 - 900 - 6.3 X
mem_slave_tlm.3 3.0 - 900 - 900 - 7.5 X
mem_slave_tlm.4 3.4 - 900 - 900 - 8.1 X
mem_slave_tlm.5 3.8 - 900 - 900 - 10 X
toy 2.6 - 900 - 900 - 7.6 X
Total 350 0 19000 3 19000 3 3600 22
TABLE III
EXPERIMENTS WITH ASSUMPTION AUTOMATA AS CONDITION
not negatively influence the overall verification result. Since
CBMC performs better on simplified NT device drivers, it
improves the overall result. Each of the three tools and
configurations has unique advantages, so it makes sense to
combine all three tools and configurations together via con-
ditional model checking, and the results are reported in the
last column (Combination B). This combination can solve
all instances that Combination A can solve, but in addition,
the performance is slightly increased for those programs that
CBMC can solve. CBMC with a very low loop bound produces
practically no overhead, and thus, this configuration should
always be included. In conclusion, via conditional model
checking, we first run an inexpensive shallow analysis to
identify the easy bugs, then run a slightly more expensive,
more in-depth analysis to solve more instances, and last run
the most expensive analysis.
C. Model Checking using Conditions from Previous Runs
Now we demonstrate how we can utilize the output condi-
tion (assumption) of one conditional model checking to im-
prove the results of a successive conditional model checking,
by feeding the negation of the generated condition of the first
run as input condition for the second run. (This is currently
restricted to different configurations of the tool CPACHECKER
because CBMC does not (yet) support the output or/and input
of conditions.)
Configurations. We experiment with explicit analysis and
predicate analysis. The first column of the Table III reports
results for explicit analysis, the second one the results for
predicate analysis with LBE. The third column combines
explicit analysis and predicate analysis as we did in Table II.
The last column combines these two configurations in the
following way: First, explicit analysis with the Assumption
Storage CPA is run and an assumption automaton based on
the generated assumptions is produced. This automaton is
similar to the automaton for the example shown in Fig. 6.
Second, predicate analysis is started using this automaton as
the condition to restrict the searched state space. The state
space that did not remain unchecked by explicit analysis is
pruned using this automaton. This way we hope that predicate
analysis will run the analysis on a smaller part of the state
space and more programs can be checked.
Discussion. For these programs, explicit analysis finds only
counterexamples which are verified as infeasible by CBMC
and thus it reports ‘unknown’ after spending some time (up
to 2 min) and nothing can be concluded about these programs.
Predicate analysis reports a correct result for three programs
but it times out for the remaining 21 programs and consumes a
significant amount of time. For a majority of these programs,
combining explicit analysis and predicate analysis does not
produce a good result as well. This is because both analysis
fails to return an answer for the given program. In other
words, explicit analysis can run all the programs in only 350 s
and visits hundreds of thousands of abstract states, but is too
imprecise, whereas predicate analysis is precise enough but too
expensive. The last column shows a dramatic improvement
when both analyses are combined using conditional model
checking, where the assumption produced by explicit analysis
is used for restricting the state space analyzed by predicate
analysis. Almost all of these programs can be successfully
analyzed. Even though the combined configuration consumes
significantly less time than predicate analysis alone, 19 more
programs can be verified. In most cases, programs can be
checked in less than 1 min.
V. CONCLUSION
Software model checking is an undecidable problem, and
therefore, we cannot create model checkers that always give
a precise answer to the verification problem. Conventional
model checkers fail when they cannot give a precise answer,
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leaving the user no information about what the tool was not
able to verify, where in the program the problem occurred, and
how much of the program was already verified. Conditional
model checking proposes to design model checkers that do not
fail, but instead summarize their work when they decide to give
up. That is, we change the outcome from {safe, unsafe, fail}
to {condition}, meaning that the model checker has verified
that the program satisfies the specification under the reported
condition.
In addition to this user feedback, conditional model check-
ing improves verification coverage and performance by mak-
ing it possible to give conditions as input that avoid certain
parts of the program. Our experiments show that such condi-
tions significantly improve the behavior of the model checker
for programs that violate the specification. This was expected,
because techniques such as bounded model checking, which
are limiting the loop unwinding during state-space exploration,
are known to be helpful for finding bugs. Conditional model
checking is a generalization of this concept, because it can use
an arbitrary condition to prevent traversing certain parts of the
state space.
The main benefit of conditional model checking is yet
another one. Conditional model checking can be used to
combine different verification tools, or different runs of the
same tool with different conditions. After the first verification
run, the resulting assumption is given as input to the second
verification run, which uses a different algorithm or condition,
and therefore can be expected to fail on different parts of the
state space. This process can be repeated until the desired
coverage is achieved.
We experimentally confirmed the benefits of conditional
model checking, by running different tools and configurations
one after the other. The best setting was to first run a shallow
analysis (CBMC with the condition to perform only one loop
unrolling), then, using the assumption that resulted from the
first analysis, run an in-depth analysis (CPACHECKER with
explicit-value analysis and a time limit of 10 s), and finally,
using the assumption produced by the second analysis, run the
exhaustive and most expensive algorithm (CPACHECKER with
predicate analysis and the condition to report the verification
assumptions after 15 min of run-time).
In summary, we have demonstrated that with conditional
model checking: (1) More problem instances can be solved.
(2) Performance can be improved, in terms of reduced run-
time and reduced memory consumption. (3) Better coverage
of the state space can be achieved for problem instances for
which neither the presence nor the absence of an error can be
proved. (4) A powerful and flexible combination of different
verification technologies is enabled.
In our future work, we will investigate heuristics to al-
gorithmically find a set of appropriate input conditions and
the most promising sequence of verification approaches, such
that the verification flow that we used in our experiments
can be determined automatically by the verification tool. We
also plan to investigate further applications of conditional
model checking. For example, conditional model checking
can support the verification of components and modules in
isolation, and then be used to compose the global verification
goal of the system from the partial results (i.e., modeling
assumptions and guarantees as ‘conditions’).
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